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Harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD: A
Proposal from India

Muria Kruger
Many scholars argue that strong protection of intellectual
property rights encourages creation and innovation, 1 but others
point out that weak protection of intellectual property rights
protects life itself by ensuring access to essential goods for
medical treatment, sustenance and development.2 This is
particularly true in the areas of education and development. 3 In
the words of Indira Gandhi, "[tihe idea of a better-ordered world
is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents and
4
there will be no profiteering from life and death."
1. See Michael W. Smith, Bringing Developing Countries'Intellectual Property
Laws to TRIPs Standards: Hurdles and Pitfalls Facing Vietnam's Efforts to
Normalize an Intellectual Regime, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 211, 215 (1999)
(stating that the traditional justification for intellectual property rights was to
encourage artistic creation and innovation); see also Robert M. Sherwood, et. al.,
Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced
Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473, 478-79 (1999) (suggesting that effective
administration of intellectual property rights will maximize the contributions of
inventors).
2. See D. Ravi Kanth, WTO Allowed Drugs to be Priced Beyond Reach of the
Poor: UN Panel, BUS. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 25565053 (stating
that the TRIPS Agreement "gives exclusive rights to pharmaceutical companies to
set high prices for their new drugs, making them unaffordable and inaccessible").
3. See Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay RoundNegotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1317, 1383 (1990) (discussing the particular importance of protecting access to
advances in education, agricultural materials and medicines to newly industrialized
countries).
4. Ghandi's quote was taken from a speech given to the 1982 World Health
Assembly. R. Michael Gadbaw & Leigh A. Kenny, India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 186, 186 (R. Michael Gadbaw &
Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988), cited in Robert Gutowski, The Marriage of
Intellectual Property and International Trade in TRIPS Agreement: Strange
Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 713, 744 (1999); see also
Gary P. Nabhan, Sharing the Benefits of Plant Resources and Indigenous Scientific
Knowledge, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 186, 191 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky
eds., 1996).
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The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs)
sets forth the minimum level of intellectual property rights5
which must be provided by all states party to the Global
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 6 TRIPs allows
developing countries to phase in intellectual property rights
over a period of time and ultimately creates a nearly uniform
standard of protection without regard to the 7 level of
development or economic policies of a specific country.
One scholar argues that stronger protection of intellectual
property rights will benefit the countries producing the most
intellectual property, which tend to be highly developed
countries with effective channels to transfer research from
educational and research facilities to industries.8 By contrast,
developing countries like India stand to lose the most from
strong intellectual property protection, because with strong
intellectual property protection they lose access to affordable
medicines, crop chemicals, and educational materials. 9
According to Vandana Shiva, director of the Research
Foundation for Science and Ecology in New Dehli, India, and a
5. Intellectual property rights are the legal rights that result from intellectual
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary, and artistic fields. Because creations of
the mind cannot be protected from another person's use like physical objects,
intellectual property rights were created to safeguard producers of intellectual
property by giving the producers time limited rights to control the use of their
creations. See INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND PRACTICE 3

(World Intellectual Property Organization ed., 1997).
6.
See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE-MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (THE URUGUAY ROUND): AGREEMENT ON TRADE-REATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs

Agreement].
7.

See

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

LAW

278-79

(Anthony

D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long, eds. 1997) (citing Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPs
Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual
Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENvT. L. J. 171 (1993)) (stating that some industries in developing countries will be
displaced temporarily while the country is getting its intellectual property protection
up to TRIPs standards).
8. See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade:
Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw 272 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds. 1997) (arguing that
developed countries have an advantage over developing countries and that these
advantages should be taken into consideration in the creation of an international
intellectual property rights regime).
9. See Emmert, supra note 3, at 1383 (stating that farmers, students, and the
sick rely on cheap access to seeds, education, and drugs for their basic way of life);
see also Dru Brenner-Beck, Do as I Say, Not as I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84,
84 (1992) (arguing that lesser developed countries do not benefit from intellectual
property rights systems until they have reached a threshold level of development).
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prominent activist in the area of biotechnology and biodiversity,
the TRIPs Agreement is a continuation of over 500 years of
colonialism of developing countries.10 She argues that developed
countries create intellectual property protection laws that drain
wealth and resources from third world countries and transfer it
back to developed countries.1 1
The protection of intellectual property rights at appropriate
12
levels can benefit both developed and developing countries.
Intellectual property can help indigenous cultures protect their
craftsmanship from foreign exploitation and protect their

10. See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND
KNOWLEDGE 11-16 (1997); see also Jarbaksh Signh Nanda, India's Commerce
Minister Scores Effects of WTO TRIPS Accord, at http://www.wtowatch.org/news/
index.cfm?ID=2135 (last visited July 17, 2000). Nanda quotes India's Commerce
Minister, Murasoli Maran, at a three day forum of the World Intellectual Property
Organization as stating,
[tihe patent rights born out of intellectual property fail the world's poor.
Nations are more interested in strengthening the WTO. Instead, WHO [sic]
must be redesigned and expanded to fill up the gaps and remove the
inequities created by the IPR [intellectual property rights] and to take care
of public health and other needs of the poor.
Id.
11. See SHIVA, supra note 10, at 10-11. But see Kevin W. McCabe, The January
1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and
Developing Countries Toward the Patentabilityof Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 41, 47 (1998) (stating that broader intellectual property protection actually will
promote social welfare and economic development of developing countries).
12. Dr. M.D. Nair, a pharmaceutical industry consultant, argues that
[i]f developing countries are to become economically strong, they need to
capitalize on their unique bio-assets, just as the OPEC countries prospered
due to their oil wealth. In order to achieve this, they need to have systems
that will provide them benefits from global development and marketing of
their medicinal plant resources.
M.D. Nair, Winning the War Against Bio-colonisation, THE HINDU, May 17, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 20488115; see also Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign
Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998) (arguing that developing countries can use
intellectual property rights as both a sword and a shield against de-culturing foreign
investments); Doris Estelle Long, The Role of Intellectual Property in Developing
Nations, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 65 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (arguing that the denial of intellectual property rights
in developing countries denies those countries the ability to develop their own
intellectual property); cf. Frank Romano, InternationalConventions and Treaties, in
536 GLOBAL TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 545, 562 Practicing Law Institute (1998)
(stating that because there is very little data on the impact of the new international
intellectual property standards and their impact on areas other than intellectual
property, there is still room for a debate of whether the standardization of
intellectual property protection will "reap the harvest of global benefits").
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traditional way of life. 13 But without proper administration and
intellectual property protection, indigenous cultures and
developing nations can lose control over important aspects of
their development and industry to the more "savvy" developed
14
countries.
This Note will examine the TRIPs Agreement and suggest
how it can achieve a better balance of intellectual property
rights between developing and developed countries. Part I
examines the role of developing countries in the TRIPs
Agreement, with a specific focus on India. India was chosen
because of its vocal protest against the TRIPs Agreement at the
Uruguay Round and its more recent proposal to amend the
TRIPs agreement to give greater protection to developing
countries. The proposal from India includes suggestions for
harmonizing the TRIPs Agreement with the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). Part II begins by examining the
TRIPs Agreement and the principal areas affected by India's
proposal. Then, it will address the CBD, how the CBD gives
better protection to the rights of developing countries, and how
India's proposal incorporates the CBD into TRIPs. Part III
reviews the merits of each of India's proposals to integrate
TRIPs into the CBD. Finally, part IV argues that while TRIPs
offers many benefits, those benefits should not overshadow the
changes which still need to be made, some of which are clearly
addressed in India's proposal.

13. According to the note by the Executive Secretary to the Committee of the
Parties, "it is only through the use of some form of intellectual property rights that
local and indigenous communities will be able to exercise the necessary degree of
control in order to allow for proper internalization of the value of their knowledge,
innovation and practices." See The Relationship Between Intellectual PropertyRights
and the Relevant Provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, United Nations Environmental Programme, Convention on Biological
Diversity, Intersessional mtg. para. 4, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ISOC/5 (1999); see also
Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge
and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998)
(discussing the limitations of using intellectual property rights to protect indigenous
cultures).
14. See Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: InternationalConflict over the
Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279 (1999) (discussing the
United States' usage of the Indians' knowledge of the neem tree and its
characteristics to create a patent of its useful chemical properties).
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I. THE PLIGHT AND ROLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A.

A CASE STUDY OF INDIA

While many Western countries saw the enactment of the
TRIPs Agreement as a monumental achievement for intellectual
15
property protection, it resulted in violent protests in India.
India could not support the TRIPs Agreement and the
intellectual property rights it would give developed countries
because the country was still in the wake of what is referred to
as "the neem tree incident."
1.

The Neem Tree Incident

The neem tree, native to India, is used by the Indian people
for a myriad of medicinal purposes. The bark has a compound
which can be used to clean teeth,16 and the leaves and seeds
have compounds which demonstrate anti-fungal, antiseptic, and
anti-viral characteristics. 17 Oils from the seeds have
contraceptive properties,

8

and the leaves and seeds also contain

pesticides. 19 Azadirachtin,

natural
a chemical extracted from the
seeds of the neem tree, was identified as an active pesticidal
substance. 20 The developed world seized upon the usefulness of
this plant. W.R. Grace, an agricultural chemical company based
in Boca Raton, Florida, stabilized azadirachtin in water and

patented both the stabilization process and the stabilized form
of azadirachtin with the United States Patent Office. 21 W.R.
15. See George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International
Patent Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 283 (1998) (stating that anger and violence
erupted in India after the passage of TRIPs).
16. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM: A TREE FOR SOLVING GLOBAL
PROBLEMS 9-10 (1992).
17. See id. at 8.
18. See id. at 10.
19. See id. at 1-3.
20. See id. at 4.
21. See U.S. Patent No. 5,281,618 (issued Jan. 25, 1994). The patent did meet
all of the U.S. patent requirements under 35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102, and 103.
These requirements were (1) the invention has some practical usefulness, (2) it is
novel in relation to the "prior art," (3) it is not obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was created, and (4) the description provided would
enable a knowledgeable person use of the invention in the best mode. 35 U.S.C. §§
101-103 (1997); see also Marden, supra note 14, at 284 (discussing Grace's
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Grace never applied for a patent in India as India did not grant
patents for agricultural products at that time.22 Shortly after the
U.S. patent was granted, a coalition of 200 different
organizations and 35 states petitioned the United States Patent
Office to invalidate the patent, calling it an act of "intellectual
and biological piracy."23 The dispute arose because it was the
knowledge of the people of India which alerted the U.S.
company to the tree's scientific uses. Without their knowledge,
the tree would have been an ordinary tree to W.R. Grace. 24 Even
though the properties of the neem tree are "common knowledge"
in India, azadirachtin met the novelty requirement for U.S.
patent law.25 Section 102 of the U.S. Patent Act only allows very
specific and limited types of prior foreign activity to invalidate a
U.S. patent for lack of novelty, and none of India's activities
meet the necessary criteria. 26 The effect of W.R. Grace's patent
is that India, despite its ownership of the neem tree, has no
legal right to develop the plant for medicinal or curative
27
purposes.
After six years of persistently campaigning against and
legally challenging the United States' acquisition of
azadirachtin, India and the azadirachtin protesters 28 won a

stabilization and patenting of neem tree products).
22. See Foster, supra note 15, at 308 (stating that India does not recognize any
biotechnology patents).
23. Ashok Sharma, Tree Focuses Debate on Control of Resources; Environment:
Third World Nations Contend They Should be Compensated for Protecting Natural
Materials,Which First World Converts to Productsand Profits, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1995, availableat 1995 WL 9846864.
24. See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between InternationalIntellectual
Property and Environmental Protection:Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH.
U. L.Q. 255, 269 (1998); see also John Tanner, India: U.S. Giant, PeasantsBattle for
"Blessed Tree", INTER PRESS SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 12, 1993,
available at 1993 WL 2534808 (quoting Vandana Shiva as saying, "[w]ithout the
Indian peasants knowledge of the medicinal and pesticidal properties of [the tree],
neem would just be another tree to Grace").
25. See Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign
PriorArt and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 376 (1997) (stating that
"while almost all domestic prior knowledge, use, or invention is considered against a
later United States patent, almost all similar foreign activity is not").
26. See id. at 376; see also Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §102 (1984).
27. See Frederick Nzwili, Multinationals Lose Exclusive Rights Over Neem
Tree, AFR. NEWS SERV., May 22, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 2161415.
28. The major protesters include Vandana Shiva, head of the Research
Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology (RFSTE); the International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement (IFOAM); and Magda Alvoet,
Environmental Minister of Belgium and a former Green member of the European
Parliament. See id.
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major victory when the opposition division of the European
Patent Office revoked the patent granted to the United State
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and W.R. Grace. 29 The
protesters in the neem tree incident hope this ruling will "mark
a turning point in the struggle against bio-piracy." 30 Others
believe the victory will be brief and any euphoria over the ruling
is misplaced because the only way effectively to stop bio-piracy
is through an integrated approach, not a case by case challenge
countries
that protects traditional health systems in developing
31
and stops bio-colonization by multinational firms.
2.

India and the Enactment of TRIPs

The enactment of the TRIPs Agreement occurred at the
Uruguay Round Agreements despite India's and other
developing countries' dissatisfaction with the intellectual
property rights provided in the agreement. 32 For several
reasons, India was left without much choice. The TRIPs
Agreement was a part of a larger package of economic
agreements, many of which were beneficial to India.33 At the
time, India was in one of the most severe financial crises in its
34
history and could not forgo any benefits of increased exports.
Moreover, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War took away India's ability to threaten to enter the
needed to
communist bloc. 35 Democratic countries no longer
36
pacify India to keep it part of the western alliance.
Since the enactment of the TRIPs Agreement, India has
addressed many of its economic problems. Prior to 1991, India
encouraged neither foreign investment nor production for
export. 37 According to the World Bank Group, India decreased
29. See id.
30. Id. (quoting Vandana Shiva's statement after the European Patent office's
ruling).
31. See Nair, supra note 12.
32. See Foster, supra note 15, at 312 (discussing the treatment of TRIPs in
India after its creation in 1995).
33. For example, one of the Uruguay Round agreements called for phasing out
the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). The MFA allowed countries to create
substantial trade barriers on their textiles. India, as the third largest exporter of
textiles to Europe and the fourth largest to the U.S., stood to gain a lot by the
reduction of trade barriers in the textile industry. See id. at 315-16.
34. See id. at 316.
35. See id. at 317.
36. See id.
37. See The World Bank Group, Countries: India, at http://www.worldbank.
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its national debt after introducing a new policy aimed at
transforming and expanding its economy. 38 Trade liberalization
and privatization of state run industries and services led to the
39
recovery of private investment and rapid growth in exports.
Currently, India has the world's sixth largest economy
measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). India's
total exports are expected to triple by the end of the year 2000
thereby making India's economy the fourth largest in the
40
world.
3.

India's Proposal

Now in a slightly restored position of bargaining power,
India is prepared to lobby for its desired protections to be
included in the TRIPs Agreement. 41 India wants to protect its
unique biological resources (such as the neem tree) as well as its42
artisans and traditional craftspeople from future exploitation. 43
To do this, India has created a proposal with five components.
The first component is that any commercial exploitation of
innovations based on biological resources would be allowed only
if the innovators share the benefits with the country through
which the resources came. This would be done through the use
44
of material transfer or transfer of information agreements.
org/html/extdr/offrep/sas/in2.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) [hereinafter World
Bank Group].
38. See id. India's national debt dropped from 8.4 percent of GDP in 1990-91 to
5.6 percent in 1998. See Foster, supra note 15, at 318 (discussing India's economical
and political environment during this time period).
39. See World Bank Group, supra note 37.
40. See Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Finger?Law, Development
and Child Labor, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 152 (1999).
41. See India for Harmonising TRIPs with Bio-diversity Pact, Bus. LINE, Sept.
3, 1999, available at 1999 WL 24404141 [hereinafter Indiafor Harmonizing].
42. See G. Srinivasan, India: Move to Prevent Theft of TraditionalSkills, Bus.
LINE, Aug. 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 24403294.
43. According to Dr. Bishwajit Dhar, the collapse of the Third Ministerial
Conference of the WTO in Seattle presented little evidence of any progress on any of
the issues flagged by India. Dr. Bishwajit Dhar, Did India Gain at Seattle?, ECON.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, available at 1999 WL 29165824; see also India Wants
Harmony in Rules on IPR, Biological Diversity, ASIA PULSE, Sept. 6, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 18772523 [hereinafter Harmony in Rules]; Indiafor Harmonising,supra
note 41; India calls for Harmonising TRIPs with CBD, THE HINDU, Sept. 3, 1999,
availableat 1999 WL 21355720; Sarabajeet K. Ken, India: 7 New Laws in the Offing
to Meet the TRIPs Deadline, Bus. LINE, Aug. 30, 1999, available at 1999 WL
24403797.
44. These would be in the form of compulsory licensing agreements. See India
Wants Harmony in Rules, supra note 43; Indiafor Harmonising,supra note 41; see
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Second, the application process for the intellectual property
right would include a statement as to the biological source of the
material and the country of origin. 45 Third, the patent
46
application should be open to public scrutiny before approval.
Fourth, the special protection granted to geographical
indications on wine and spirits should be expanded to include
other foods and products. 47 Fifth and finally, the proposal
contains a provision for a more effective implementation of the
transfer of technology to developing countries by requiring
companies which produce environmentally sound technology to
sell this technology at fair and favorable terms to states that are
obligated to adopt8 the environmentally sound technologies by
4
international law.

B.

OTHER OPPOSITION TO TRIPS

India has not been the only voice to recognize the
shortcomings of TRIPs and the need for greater biodiversity
protection. 49 Another treaty, the CBD, 50 conflicts with the TRIPs
Agreement because of its greater protection of biodiversity
rights.5 1 The CBD covers the conservation of biological diversity,
also Raghav Narsalay, India: Evolving a WTO regime - India's agenda, Aug. 10,
2000, BuS. LINE, available at 2000 WL 24947965 (suggesting that India should
.muster necessary support on the positive interpretation" of TRIPs so that
developing countries may better protect their plant varieties).
45. See India for Harmonising,supra note 41.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See India Calls for HarmonisingTRIPs with CBD, supra note 43.
49. See Klauss Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal
Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 111 (1996) (arguing that the protection of biodiversity has been sacrificed for
the increasing need for and protection of biotechnology, which has resulted in the
TRIPs Agreement); see also Valentine Tejera, Tripping over Property Rights: Is it
Possible to Reconcile the Convention on Biological Diversity with Article 27 of the
TRIPs Agreement?, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967 (1999) (arguing that TRIPs needs to
include provisions from the CBD in order to recognize the rights of indigenous
peoples and communities).
50. The Convention on BiologicalDiversity and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs): Relationships and Synergies, United Nations
Environmental Programme, Convention on Biological Diversity, 3d mtg. para. 43,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/23 (1996).
51. See Tejera, supra note 49, at 982-83. Tejera discusses this conflict by using
the specific example of a letter written by the President of the United States urging
Congress to adopt the CBD. In his letter, the President recognized that the CBD
attempts to conserve biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and
the fair and equitable sharing of genetic resource benefits. See Letter of Transmittal
from William J. Clinton to the United States Senate, Convention on Biological
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the sustainable use of biological components, and the equitable
52
sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.
Although the CBD gives effective intellectual property rights to
developing countries, those rights are taken away by
agreements such as TRIPs. 53 Without adequate protection of
biogenetical rights, scholars argue that India's biogenetical
wealth will be transferred into the "hands of the corporations of
the industrialized world."5 4 Because the CBD attempts to give
more protection to biodiversity, much of India's proposal for
amending the TRIPs agreement involves harmonization of the
two agreements by incorporating provisions of the CBD into
55
TRIPs.
Some argue that the protection of biodiversity granted
under the CBD, while protecting individual countries from
exploitation, is not enough to protect indigenous cultures from
exploitation. 56 When developing countries are granted
sovereignty to develop their own systems for patenting
indigenous or traditional knowledge, the developing country
Diversity 1, Nov. 20, 1993, available at 1993 WL 796847, at *1. The letter further
stated that the United States would, however, resist any efforts leading to a
decrease in levels of protection over intellectual property rights. See id.
Thus, it seems that the policy of the United States is willing to respect a
country's autonomy regarding its conservation policies as long as it does
not interfere with a system of intellectual property rights. It is difficult to
reconcile the United States' position, which limits the autonomy of
signatory nations with Article 3 of the CBD.
Tejera, supra note 49, at 982. Article 3 of the CBD recognizes that "(s)tates
have.. .the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies." United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-20
(1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 at art. 3 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993)
[hereinafter CBD]. "Thus, now there exists a large discrepancy between the terms of
Article 3 of the CBD and the terms of the TRIPs Agreement." Tejera, supra note 49,
at 983.
52. See generally CBD, supra note 51.
53. Ms. Shiva stated that even though '[tihe Biodiversity Convention accords
India sovereignty over its own resources to be used in a sustainable
manner... [tirade liberalisation policies seek to undermine sovereignty of the nation
state by diminishing the state's control over flow of resources and replacing it with
market control." VANDANA SHIVA, ET AL., ECOLOGICAL COST OF ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 10 (1997).
54. Id.
55. See generally Harmony in Rules, supra note 43; India for Harmonising,
supra note 41; India calls for Harmonising TRIPs with CBD, supra note 43; Ken,
supra note 43 (giving examples of ways in which TRIPs can be harmonized with the
CBD).
56. See Lakshami Sarma, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the
Form of InternationalAgreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 107, 109 (1999).
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must choose between profiting from the sale of indigenous
innovation and protecting the indigenous knowledge from
exploitation. 57 Developing countries face pressure from
developed countries to equalize their economies with the
developed countries, and thereby gain more power in the global
marketplace.5 8 The result is that although the indigenous
cultures are no longer being exploited by foreign states, an
indigenous culture may be exploited by its own state.
II. BACKGROUND OF TRIPS AND CBD
A.

CURRENT PROTECTION UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

The TRIPs Agreement went into effect on January 1, 1995,
and is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on
intellectual property.59 The TRIPs Agreement has several main
goals and objectives, which include: (1) the reduction of
distortion and impediments to international trade; (2) the
promotion of effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights; and (3) the assurance that the measures and
procedures used to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. 60 These goals
and objectives further include the promotion of technological
innovation, the transfer and dissemination of technology, and
"the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
economic
knowledge.. .in a manner conducive to social and
61
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."
TRIPs is a minimum standards agreement that allows
states to give greater protection to intellectual property rights if
they choose. 62 It also assures owners of intellectual property
rights that all GATT member states will recognize their
intellectual property rights at least at the required minimum
57. See id. at 109 n.21.
58. See id.
59. See Overview: the TRIPs Agreement, at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/tripse.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2000) (referring generally to TRIPs and
giving a broad overview of the agreement and its aspects) [hereinafter Overview].
60. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at pmbl.

61. Id. at art. 7.
62. TRIPs is set up as a minimal terms agreement in the first Article of the
agreement. It reads, "members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement." Id. at art. 1.
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level. 63 Generally, the three main areas of the TRIPs Agreement
are standards, enforcement provisions, and dispute settlement
provisions. 64 The substantive standards include protection of
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits,
undisclosed information (including trade secrets), and the
65
control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses.
TRIPs builds upon several previous treaties by attempting to:
(1) extend patents to all areas without regard to the area of
technology; (2) create a minimum of 20 year protection for all
patents; (3) impose criminal sanctions for infringements; (4)
allow for the possibility of an exemption because of moral
beliefs; (5) assure reasonable payment for compulsory licensing;
and (6) allow for more effective dispute resolution over terms of
66
the agreement.
Prior to TRIPs, the Paris Convention, an intellectual
property agreement that became effective in 1967, specifically
dealt with patents, trademarks, and designs. 67 A second treaty,
the Berne Convention, which dealt with copyrights, became
effective in 1971.68 TRIPs is a more comprehensive treaty
because it fills the substantial gaps left by the Paris and Berne
conventions. The Paris Convention only required a second
country to recognize a patent granted by a first country if the
inventor applied for a patent in the second country within one
69
year from when the patent was granted by the first country.

63. See id.
64. See Overview, supra note 59. See generally, TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6
(stating the specific language of the agreement).
65. See M.A. Kamal, Role of WTO in Shaping a Balanced Global Economy,
INDEP., Aug. 26, 1999, available at 1999 WL 21950370. See generally TRIPs
Agreement, supra note 6.
66.

See BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING:

GATT, TRIPS AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, pt. 1, sec. 1.5.5, at 24-25 (1997) (discussing TRIPs
extension of previous treaties).
67. See Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property March 20,
1883 revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]. The main goal of the Paris Convention was to "eliminate
discrimination on the national level, thereby assuring foreigners that they could
acquire and enforce their intellectual property rights in the same way as nationals of
any member country of the Convention." Laurinda L. Hinks & James R. Hobein,
Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading
Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 769, 778-79 (1997).
68. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; see also Sodipo, supra note 66, at pt. 2, sec. 6.2 at 196.
69. See Foster, supra note 15, at 287.
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The Paris Convention also lacked effective enforcement
mechanisms and did not require any specific degree of
protection.7 0 The Berne Convention did not contain any
minimum standards for determining when an infringement
occurred, nor did it have an enforcement mechanism, or any
71
way to impose sanctions for infringement.
Most notably, TRIPs applies to all nations that are party to
the GATT, whereas the Paris and Berne Conventions applied
only to those states that were parties to the conventions. 72 This
was an important gap to fill in the eyes of developed countries
because some of the major culprits of piracy and counterfeiting
were countries that were not party to the Paris and Berne
Conventions. 73 The majority of the wrongdoers were developing
74
countries that created industries based upon counterfeiting.
Many developing countries refused to grant patents for
pharmaceuticals and built businesses on the production of drugs
pirated from other countries. 75 For these reasons, developing
countries were generally opposed to TRIPs.
Counterfeiting was not the only concern of developed
countries addressed in the TRIPs Agreement. An estimated twothirds of the world's plant species originate in developing
countries; and it is estimated that thirty-five percent of
endangered species may have medicinal properties. 76 It is
70. See id. Disputes under the Paris Convention were to be handled by the
International Court of Justice, which subjected any dispute to long and cumbersome
procedures. See Monique Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 121, 131 (1994).
71.

See

ANTONY

D'AMATO

&

DORIS

ESTELLE

LONG,

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 267-68 (1997) (discussing problems found under

previous treaties). The disputes under the Berne Convention were also subject to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and its long and cumbersome
procedures. See Cordray, supra note 70, at 131.
72. See Foster, supra note 15, at 288 (naming several developing countries that
were not party to the Paris Convention and therefore did not have to follow the
provisions of the onvention).
73. See Sodipo, supra note 66, pt. 2, sec. 6.2, at 196 (discussing TRIPs'
extension of previous treaties).
74. See Reichman, supra note 7, at 278 (discussing the costs of the
displacement of developing countries industries that are dependent upon piracy and
counterfeiting).
75. See Xiao-Lin Zhou, US-China Trade Dispute and China's Intellectual
Property Rights Protection, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 414

(Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long, eds., 1997) (discussing the differences in
how countries grant intellectual property rights, including some countries which do
not grant any patents for drug development).
76. Gumisai Mutume, Trade: Environmental ProtectionRuns Up Against Free
Trade, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4089981.
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further estimated that pharmaceutical industries in developed
countries receive at least $3 billion per year from plants and
other microbials of developing countries. 77 According to Anju
Sharma, the coordinator for the global environmental
governance unit of the Center for Science and Environment
based in New Delhi, India, "[p]owerful economic interests and
the pharmaceutical industry have essentially ended up
78
dominating the decision making."
Another scholar accused the United States and other
developed countries of circumventing the United Nations World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 79 The complaint
contends that the United States used the GATT as the enforcing
agent on an agreement for international recognition of
intellectual property rights to take advantage of the limited
leverage developing countries have in the GATT.8 0 This limited
leverage allowed the United States and other developed
countries to push the TRIPs Agreement through without
considering the concerns of developing countries.8 1 Developing
countries, as members of the GATT, were forced to comply with
the TRIPs Agreement because all members of the GATT must
77. Winning the War Against Bio-colonisation, THE HINDU, May 17, 2000,
availableat 2000 WL 20488115.
78. Danielle Knight, Environment: Global Pacts Favor Wealthy Nations, New
Book Says, INTER. PRESS SERV., Apr. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4090857
(quoting Sharma in an article about Sharma's recent book, "Green Politics, Global
Environmental Negotiations." The book outlines and critiques international
environmental treaties, including the CBD).
79. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER & IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ANTITRUST 222 (1998). WIPO is a United Nations
agency which aims to promote creative intellectual activity and facilitate the
transfer of technology with regard to intellectual property in developing countries.
See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389. One of the reasons developed countries may want to
circumvent the WIPO is the belief that "the WIPO is dominated by UN-style voting
blocs" which are controlled by developing countries. See Alexander A. Caviedes,
InternationalCopyright Law: Should the European Union Dictate its Development?,
16 B.U. INT'L L. J. 165, 177 (1998). Developed countries criticize the NWIPO for
failing to provide effective enforcement procedures and for creating provisions which
are too vague to provide for adequate intellectual property protection. See Hinks &
Hobein, supra note 67, at 782. Since the passage of TRIPs in 1995, the WIPO has
addressed issues not raised by TRIPs. These issues resulted in three additional
treaties; the Draft Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the Draft Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of
Performers and Producers of Phonograms, and the Draft Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Databases. See Romano, supra note 12, at 555-56.
80. See Sell, supra note 79, at 222.
81. See id. (stating that the one concession granted to developing countries was
giving them a longer period of time to implement TRIPs in their own countries).
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comply with its agreements. Developing countries cannot afford
to sacrifice GATT membership in protest of a specific treaty
because they need to belong to the GATT to reap the benefits of
treaties which favor their countries.82 India depends on the
GATT for import and export benefits. This makes India an
excellent example of a developing country circumvented by the
passage of TRIPs through the WTO, then forced to enact TRIPs
despite disagreeing with many of the TRIPs provisions from the
beginning.83
India's proposal specifically incorporates changes to parts of
already existing articles in the TRIPs Agreement. The proposed
changes alter Articles 22 and 23, which cover geographical
indication protection, and Articles 27-34, which cover patent
protection.8 4 A few other provisions of the TRIPs Agreement also
are relevant to India's proposal; these include Article 65, dealing
with transitional arrangements for developing countries, and
Articles 41-60, dealing with the mechanism for dispute
resolution.
1.

GeographicalIndicationProtection

Article 22 of TRIPs defines geographical indications as
"indications which identify a good as originating in the territory
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin." 5 Article 22
gives the state that is being petitioned the right to refuse the
trademark registration if the goods indicated are not originally
from the territory indicated and if the trademark would mislead
consumers.8 6 There is no provision requiring that a third party
82. See Sodipo, supra note 66, pt. 2, sec. 6.2, at 196-97.
83. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (referring specifically to India's
need for the textile benefits GATT would bring to India). India's Commerce Minister
commented on this situation, stating
[t]here is a proverb that just because the camel knelt down, it was loaded.
The developing countries met with the same fate in the Uruguay Round
because they knelt down. Thus, knowingly or unknowingly, the developing
countries have made a major concession of vital nature, and the whole
architecture of international trade has to be fundamentally recast by
national governments.
Nanda, supra note 10.
84. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing India's proposal
to harmonize TRIPs and the CBD).
85. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 22, para. 1.
86. Id. at art. 22, para. 3.
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be given the right to prevent another country from recognizing a
trademark using a geographical indication in the third party's
country. 87 For example, India does not have the right to object to
a trademark recognized by the United States, even if the
product indicates that it is from India, unless the U.S. has
created legislation allowing third parties to object.
Geographical indications for wines and spirits are treated
differently. Under Article 22, general indications of geographical
distinctions can be challenged by an outside country "if
8s
legislation so permits or at the request of an interested party,"
but under Article 23 for wines and spirits, "[e]ach member shall
provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use of a
geographical indication identifying wines for wines not
originating in the place indicated... ."89 This provision applies
even when the public is not being misled, there is no unfair
competition, and the indication on the product is accompanied
by words such as "kind," "style," and "imitation".90 The right for
third party complaints to be heard with regard to wines and
spirits is mandatory under TRIPs. Article 23 further
incorporates the same language used in Article 22, allowing
countries to ask for refusal or invalidation "if a Member's
domestic
legislation so permits or at the request of an interested
91
party."
2.

PatentProtection

Under Article 27, TRIPs provides broad protection for
patents by obligating members to make patents available for
both products and processes and to provide for patents in all
fields of technology. 92 TRIPs prohibits patent discrimination
based on the place of the invention, field of technology, and
whether the product is going to be produced domestically or
imported from another country. 93 The purpose of Article 27 is to
87. See id. at art. 22 (indicating generally that no provision such as this exists).
88. Id.
89. Id. at art. 23, para. 1 (emphasis added).
90. Overview, supra note 59.
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 23, para. 2.
92. Id. at art. 27, para. 1. The words "inventive" and "capable of industrial
application" are synonyms for the words 'non-obvious' and 'useful.' See Michael L.
Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protection in An Age of
Advancing Technology, in

INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY LAw

275

(Anthony D'Amato & Estelle Long, eds. 1997).
93. Doane, supra note 92, at 275 (discussing the prohibitions on patent
discrimination under TRIPs).
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stop individual countries from excluding certain materials from
patentability. 94 These materials include drugs and medicines,
farm chemicals, and products to be produced out of the country.
There are a few exceptions in Article 27 that allow countries
to deny patents. 95 Article 27(2) allows members to exclude

inventions

from

patentability

if

avoiding

commercial

exploitation of the material is necessary for ordre public or

morality. 96 Article 27(3)(a) allows members to exclude
"diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment
of humans or animals," 97 and 27(3)(b) provides for the exclusion
of "plants and animals

other

than micro-organisms,

and

essential biological processes for the production of plants or
animals

other

than

non-biological

and

microbiological

processes." 98 Despite the exception in 27(b)(3), members must
provide for protection of plant varieties "either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof."99

Although these exceptions might seem to allow countries
extensive leeway in refusing to grant patents, the exceptions are

not as broad as they appear. 10 0 In the WTO, the "national
treatment principle" forbids governments from treating foreign

goods

differently

than

domestic

goods. 10 1 This

principle

condemns the creation of additional requirements to protect

domestic industries from foreign competition.10 2 So, when a
country decides to regulate a certain area under TRIPs, the
regulation cannot apply only to foreign imports, it has to be a
genuine regulation that also applies to domestic production of

94. See id. (stating that "[t]his section represents a significant step towards
establishing basic patent standards in international law").
95. TRIPs Article 27(3)(b) is currently under review, although there is
disagreement about how much the review should encompass. Developed countries
argue that review should only include the implementation methods, while others
such as India, Egypt, and the African Group would like the review to include a
possible revision of Article 27(3)(b) itself. See Nair, supra note 12, at *6.
96. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27, para. 2.
97. Id. at art. 27, para. 3(a).
98. Id. at art. 27, para. 3(b).
99. Id.
100. Foster, supra note 15, at 290 (stating that even though the exception may
appear broad on its face, it will not be useful for local copiers because of the
requirements for the exception). But cf. Doane, supra note 92, at 275 (stating that
the exceptions substantially limit protection for biotechnology).
101. Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International
Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1999) (discussing the difference between
regulatory protectionism and genuine regulation for a legitimate objective).
102. See id.
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the same good. 1 3 Following this principle, the TRIPs Agreement
contains an ordre public exception, which allows a country to
deny a patent on the grounds of the public policy of that
country. 10 4 However, the ordre public or morality exception can
only be used if the marketing of the invention is outlawed or
regulated evenly within the country's boundaries. 10 5 The
medical methods exception aims to facilitate the dissemination
of innovative medical treatment and cannot be used as a general
term to refuse patents to pharmaceuticals. 10 6 The word
"effective" is used as a limitation on the sui generis systems;
countries cannot completely create their own systems without
boundaries.10
A further exception to unlimited patent rights is found in
Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPs. Article 30 provides that "[m]embers
may provide limited exceptions to exclusive rights conferred by
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties."' 0o Article 31 provides for the compulsory licensing of
patents, 0 9 circumscribed by a strict set of circumstances."10
Compulsory licensing may occur when consideration of the
individual merits of the situation show that the license has been
made on reasonable terms and conditions, the scope and
duration of the license is limited, the license is non-exclusive
and non-assignable, and it is authorized for primarily domestic
market purposes."' The Article also provides for remuneration
if a license is used improperly and for methods of judicial
2
review."1
103. See id.
104. See Timothy G. Ackermann, Dis'ordre'ly Loopholes: TRIPs Patent
Protection, GATT and the ECJ,32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 489, 504 (1997).
105. See Foster, supra note 15, at 290 (explaining the reasons why TRIPs' patent
exceptions are not as broad as they may appear).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 290-91.
108. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 30.
109. Compulsory licensing is defined as an "involuntary contract between a
willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state." Gianna
Julian-Arnold, InternationalCompulsory Licensing: The Rationalesand the Reality,
22 IDEA 349 (1993) (quoting P. Gorecki, Regulating the Price of PrescriptionDrugs in
Canada:Compulsory Licensing, Product Selection and Government Reimbursement
Programmes(Economic Council of Canada, 1981).
110. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 31.
111. Id. at art. 31(a)-(f).
112. Id. at art. 31(g)-(1).
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TransitionalArrangements

Although they are not included in India's proposal for
harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD, the transitional
arrangements for developing and least-developed countries
deserve discussion. All countries had a one-year grace period
after the enactment of TRIPs before they had to enforce the
agreement within their country. 113 Article 65 gives developing
countries a five-year period of transition during which they do
not have to enforce the laws of the TRIPs Agreement. 114 But if
the developing country previously excluded patent protection for
a specific intellectual property right, that developing country is
given a total of ten years to comply with TRIPs in that specific
area. 115 Article 66 gives least-developed countries a ten-year
grace period for creating
laws that will enforce adequately the
6
TRIPs Agreement."
4.

Dispute Resolution

There is one last area of TRIPs that deserves discussion.
The provision relating to dispute resolution is set forth in
Article 41; this provision sets the TRIPs Agreement apart from
all prior international intellectual property agreements.
Paragraph 1 of the dispute resolution mechanism in the TRIPs
Agreement provides:
[miembers shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in
this Part are available under their national law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to
prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers117to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against their abuse.

Further, paragraph 2 provides that the procedures for
enforcement should be fair and equitable and not unduly
complicated, costly, or time consuming.11 8 The inclusion of this
mechanism allows countries to bring any dispute that arises

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at art. 65, para. 1.
Id. at art. 65, para. 2.
See id. at art. 65, para. 4
See id. at art. 66, para. 1.
Id. at art. 41, para. 1.
Id. at art. 41, para. 2.
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under the treaty before a dispute resolution body.11 9 No
intellectual property agreement prior to TRIPs had such a
mechanism. Because the agreement is under the GATT, there
are also adequate measures to ensure enforcement of the
decisions made by the dispute resolution body.
B.

PROTECTION UNDER THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY

The CBD was a product of the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development in Rio De Janeiro (the "Earth
Summit") in June of 1992,120 and became effective on December
29, 1993.121 There are 175 parties to the Convention, including

122
all major countries except the United States.
The Preamble lays out the three broad objectives of the
CBD: (1) conservation of biological diversity; (2) sustainable use
of biological diversity; and (3) fair and equitable sharing of
123
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.
Article 3 gives states "the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies."124
Biological resources are defined to include "genetic resources,
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic
component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value
125
for humanity."
Like the TRIPs Agreement, the CDB addresses the issue of
transferring biotechnology between states. Unlike TRIPs, which
obligates countries to give adequate, minimum protection to
intellectual property rights, the CBD obligates countries to
conserve, sustainably use, and guarantee access to genetic
resources in return for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
from the utilization of the genetic resources. 126 Although these

119. See generally id. at pt. 3, arts. 41-60 (discussing the general provisions of
the dispute resolution mechanism).
120. See CBD, supra note 52.
121. See id.
122. Craig L. Carr & Gary L Scott, MultilateralTreaties and the Environment:A
Case Study in the Formationof Customary InternationalLaw, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POLVY 313, 324 (1999). The U.S. signed the treaty in 1993 but had not ratified the

treaty as of 1999. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention
on Biological Diversity, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2411 (Nov. 19, 1993).
123. See CBD, supra note 52, at pmbl.
124. Id. at art. 3.
125. Id. at art. 2.
126. McManis, supra note 24, at 260 (discussing the major provisions of the
CBD).
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aims are quite different from TRIPs, they are not diametrically
opposed to TRIPs. Without reconciliation, they can produce
quite different results - one allowing a country to protect itself
against bio-piracy of foreign states and one forcing a state to
recognize intellectual property rights which may not be
beneficial to the preservation of the biodiversity in that state.
1.

Article 15 - Access to Genetic Resources

Article 15 of the CBD provides for access to genetic
resources. 12 7 Paragraph 1 recognizes the state's sovereign rights
over its resources and the state's ability to regulate its resources
through national legislation. 128 Paragraph 2 acknowledges that
although states have sovereign rights, the states should work
toward the facilitation of access to genetic resources and not to
create restrictions that run counter to the objectives of the
CBD. 129 In facilitating access, the state is not simply giving a
benefit. Rather, the access to and the sharing of benefits from
genetic resources "shall be on mutually agreed terms" between
the state and the party desiring access to the genetic
130
material.
2.

Article 16- Transfer of Technology

Article 16 addresses the access to and transfer of
technology.131 Paragraph 1 specifically recognizes "that
technology includes biotechnology." 32 Paragraph 1 further
states that members are to "facilitate access for and transfer
to.. .technologies that are relevant to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic
resources and do not cause significant damage to the
environment.1 33 Paragraph 2 specifies the terms of the access
and transfer. The terms shall be facilitated on "fair and most
favourable terms, including El concessional and preferential
terms where mutually agreed, and, where necessary, in
accordance with the financial mechanism." 34 Paragraph 2
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

CBD, supra note 52, at art. 15.
Id. at art. 15, para. 1.
See id. at art. 15, para. 2.
Id. at art. 15, paras. 4 & 7.
Id. at art. 16.
Id. at art. 16, para. 1.
Id.
Id. at art. 16, para. 2. The financial mechanism is established in Articles 20
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further recognizes that when the technology is subject to
patents or other intellectual property rights, the access and
transfer to the technology must be consistent with the
135
protection of intellectual property rights.
Paragraph 3 requires each contracting party to "take
legislative, administrative or policy measures.. .with the aim
that the Contracting Parties, in particular those that are
developing countries, which provide genetic resources are
provided access to and transfer of technology which makes use
of those resources." 136 Paragraph 3 also provides that the access
and transfer must be on mutually agreed terms and be in
accordance with international law and paragraph 4 and 5 of the
37
Article.
Paragraph 4 aims at the contracting party's national legal
obligations with respect to the regulation of the private sector:
Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, with the aim that the private sector
facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technology
referred to in paragraph 1 above for the benefit of both governmental
138
institutions and the private sectors of developing countries.

Private parties who are not directly addressed through the
Convention are indirectly reached through each contracting
party.
Paragraph 5 is a statement of cooperation, recognizing that
other intellectual property rights have an effect on the
implementation of the CBD, but requiring all contracting
parties to work to implement the Convention and create laws
which do not run counter to the Convention's objectives. 39 The
contracting parties adopted Paragraph 5 as a compromise
between the view that intellectual property rights are essential
for technology transfer and the opposing view that intellectual
property rights can be ignored. 140 Because the dispute was not
resolved, the parties drafted this compromise paragraph, which
neither strengthened nor weakened intellectual property

and 21
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

of the CBD.
Id. at art. 16, para. 2.
Id. at art. 16, para. 3.
Id. at art. 16, para. 3.
Id. at art. 16, para. 4.
Id. at art. 16, para. 5.
McManis, supra note 24, at 264 (citing Michael Gollin, The Convention on
BiologicalDiversity and Intellectual Property Rights in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING:
USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 289, 295 (1993)).
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rights. 141 The parties left the dispute
for resolution by the
142
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
The CBD's protection of the transfer of technology for the
use of biological sources from a country is important to protect
developed countries from intellectual property exploitation.
According to President Ali Hassan Mulinyi of Tanzania:
[miost of us in developing countries find it difficult to accept the notion
that biodiversity should flow freely to industrial countries while the
flow of biological products from industrial countries it patented, were
expensive and considered private property at the firms that produce
them. This
asymmetry reflects the inequality of opportunity and is
143
unjust.

Article 16's transfer of technology agreement creates a
positive commitment by developed countries to "provide and/or
facilitate" the transfers of technologies.' 44 These transfer of
technology agreements have grown out of the idea that
developed countries have a moral duty to assist developing
countries in an attempt to bridge the economic development
gap. 45 Transferring technologies to developing countries on
concessional and
preferential terms is one way to attempt to
146
bridge the gap.
III. EXAMINING INDIA'S PROPOSAL
India's proposal for harmonizing TRIPs and the CBD
contains positive and necessary suggestions, but some of its
suggestions are ineffective for helping India and other
developing countries reach a more equitable system of
intellectual property protection. For purposes of discussion,
India's proposal has been broken down into three main
categories: transfer agreements; changes to the application
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Quoted in Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing PropertyRights in
Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN ENVT'L. L. J. 74, 89 (1997) (citing
Report of the United Nations Conference on Env't and Dev., at 36, UN. Doc. A/CONF.

151/26/Rev.1 (1993)).
144. CBD, supra note 52, at sec. 16, para. 1; see also Gaetan Verhoosel, Beyond
the
Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transferring
Environmentally Sound Technologies, 11 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 49, 49 (1998)

(stating that the relevant clauses of the CBD create a commitment to transfer
technology).
145. Verhoosel, supra note 144, at 50 (discussing the ideological debate behind
transfer of technology agreements).
146.

See id.
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process; and geographical indications.
A.

TRANSFER AGREEMENTS

India's proposal includes transfer agreements in two
different areas: one for the use of biological resources 147 and
another for environmentally sound technology. 148 Currently
TRIPs does not include specific provisions providing for transfer
agreements of biological resources or environmentally sound

technology. Instead of providing specifically for transfer
agreements, it could be argued that TRIPs provides for the
transfer of necessary knowledge and resources through its

compulsory license provision 149 and the exceptions listed under
Article 27(3).150 Compulsory licensing and Article 27(3) do give
states some ability to limit the exclusive patent rights of the
right holder, but for a compulsory license all of the specific
provisions stated in Article 31 must be met.15' One of these
conditions is obtaining authorization from the right holder
under "reasonable commercial terms and conditions."' 51 It is

only when "such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time" that a state may use the patent

without permission from the right holder.' 53 But even without
permission, the right holder "shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
1 54
the economic value of the authorization."
account

Furthermore, both the compulsory license provision and Article
27(3) only allow a country to refuse to recognize and enforce a
patent within its borders. Neither provision in TRIPs creates an

147. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing India's proposal
requiring transfer of information for the use of biological resources).
148. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing India's proposal
requiring transfer of environmentally sound technology).
149. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 31.
150. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions under
Article 27(3)).
151. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirements for compulsory licensing under Article 31 of TRIPs).
152. TRIPs specifically states, "such use may only be permitted if, prior to such
use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been
successful within a reasonable period of time." TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at
art. 31(b).
153. Id. The requirement of waiting for a reasonable time may also be waived
"in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in
cases of public non-commercial use." Id.
154. Id. at art. 31(h).
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affirmative obligation on the part of developed countries to
ensure developing countries have access to necessary biological
resources and environmentally sound technologies.
The CBD, on the other hand, provides for transfer
agreements of biological resources and environmentally sound
technology. 1 5 Transfer agreements and compulsory licensing
are similar in that both create a situation where the rights of a
potential or actual patentor are suspended to allow general use
of the material. But transfer agreements go beyond compulsory
licensing and the enforcement of involuntary contracts by
providing that developed countries should have an affirmative
obligation to transfer technology and biological resources that
15 6
will aid developing countries in their own development.
Article 15 of the CBD states, "[e]ach Contracting Party shall
endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic
resources."15 7 and "with the aim of sharing in

a fair and

equitable way the results of the research and development."5 5
Article 16 of the CBD states,
[a]ccess to and transfer of technology shall be provided and/or
facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on
concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed .... In the
case of technology subject to intellectual property rights, such access
and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are
consistent with 159
the adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights.

155. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. At Article 15(7), the CBD
states,
[e]ach contracting party shall take legislative, administrative, or policy
measures, as appropriate.. with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable
way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from
the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the
Contracting Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon
mutually agreed terms.
CBD, supra note 52, at art. 16.
Article 16(2) states, "[aiccess to and transfer of technology referred to in
paragraph 1 above to developing countries shall be provided and/or facilitated under
fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms
where mutually agreed." CBD, supra note 52, at art. 16.
156. See Verhoosel, supra note 144, at 49 (stating with regard to transfer of
environmentally sound technology, "[tihese clauses, generally, provide for some sort
of commitment on the part of the developed contracting parties to promote, facilitate
or finance the transfer of environmentally sound technology to their developing
counterparts").
157. CBD, supra note 52, at art. 15(2) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at art. 15(7) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at art. 16(2) (emphasis added).
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Another failure of the compulsory licensing agreement
provision in TRIPs is that the compulsory license provision does
not specifically provide for the circumstances in which transfer
of technology is appropriate. Although TRIPs provides that
compulsory licensing would be appropriate in circumstances of
extreme emergency or for non-public use, 160 the term "extreme
emergency" is vague, and could be interpreted to exclude the
right to grant a compulsory license for environmentally sound
technology. The CBD provides the necessary specificity by
including language providing for the transfer of biological
resources and environmentally sound technology in Articles 15
& 16.
Specifically providing for the transfer of environmentally
sound technology is a good idea because it highlights the
importance of providing environmentally sound technology to
everyone. Requiring its transfer recognizes that some resources
are so crucial for the general good that we should make these
resources available to all who need them, regardless of who can
pay. For example, it is now fairly well established that damage
to the environment anywhere in the world eventually hurts
everyone. A more specific example is the resulting economic
losses from deforestation. Deforestation results in decreasing
the number of discoverable genetic varieties and endangers the
preservation of unique ecosystems. 161 It is estimated that only
one percent of tropical forest species have been surveyed for
potential beneficial uses. 162 The vast majority of tropical forests
are located in developing countries, and in an attempt to provide
for these countries' growing populations and to pay back their
foreign debts, developing countries are clearing away the forests
163
for timber and other capital gain ventures.
In the words of one scholar regarding environmental
concerns, "the industrialized world realized that they had
messed up the house and that they could not clean it up by
1 64 Therefore, making
simply keeping their own bedroom tidy."
an exception for the transfer of environmentally sound
technology and making it available to all that need it at costs
they can afford benefits everyone. The initial profit for inventing
these technologies may not exist to the same extent, but the
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 31(b).
See Bosselman, supra note 49, at 113.
See id.
See id.
Verhoosel, supra note 144, at 53.
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overall benefit of protecting the natural environment should
outweigh the temporary loss of profit. As the example of the
deforestation of tropical forests demonstrates, the dangers of
irreplaceable, permanent loss due to environmental damage
may be so detrimental that any short run gain is outweighed by
long term harm.
It may be argued that the partial removal of
environmentally sound technology from market forces will
reduce incentives to create environmentally sound technology. 165
But developed and developing countries can still create other
incentives to promote the creation of environmentally sound
technologies.1 66 Further, if India's proposal for harmonizing
TRIPs and the CBD is written only to require "fair and most
favorable" terms to states that are obligated to adopt the
technologies by international law, these terms do not require a
gift. Terminology such as "fair and most favorable" gives
countries sovereignty to bargain over the conditions of
transferring technology in or out of a country. There is still a
trade for the technology, which may not be equal to "reasonable
commercial terms," but is still giving one party remuneration for
the development of the technology, and allowing the other side
use of the technology if the technology's use is prescribed by law.
There are problems with India's proposals for transferring
technologies. The first involves defining the legal obligations
under the current language of the CBD. 167 For example, the
CBD requires members to "provide and/or facilitate access for
and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that
are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of
165.

See id. at 67.

[I]t is no longer seriously questioned that the enhanced protection of these
IPRs [intellectual property rights] in developing countries is an important
tool to increase the influx of new technologies and that the option of
granting compulsory licenses to EST [environmentally sound technologies]

is outright simplistic and counterproductive. Any solution for enhanced
EST transfer will, therefore, have to be consistent with the protection of
IPRs.
Id.
166. See Sykes, supra note 101, at 6 (arguing that while environmental
regulations disguised as regulatory protectionism are not permissible under the
treaty created the WTO, regulations which are "nondiscriminatory and necessary to
the attainment of legitimate, nonprotectionist regulatory objectives will not be
prohibited in politically savvy trade agreements").
167. See Verhoosel, supra note 144, at 62-63 (arguing that a legal obligation is
difficult to implement when it is unclear exactly what and how much has to be
transferred).
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biological diversity. .. "168 The issue here is defining exactly what
"facilitation" requires. 169 The language is ambiguous as to
whether "facilitation" means enforcing transfer agreements or
just encouraging them to occur. Any language incorporating or
allowing transfer agreements should be clear as to what type of
action countries are required to take with regard to transfer
agreements. If an obligation to create transfer agreements
exists, the obligation should be clearly stated in the text. Also,
some argue it would be impossible to enforce a uniform
definition of what it means to "transfer" technology to each
country.17 0 The argument would then turn to defining transfer
in a functional manner rather than a formal manner. 1 A
transfer of technology agreement substantively should be the
same -meaning that the country receiving the technology gains
17 2
an understanding of how and why the technology works.
Therefore, the manner in which the transfer of technology
occurs may be different depending on the country's ability to
handle the information. The key would be that the substantive
foundation, i.e. understanding and ability to use the technology,
the form of the transfer may look
would be the same, although
73
different in each country.
B.

THE APPLICATION PROCESS

In addition to transfer agreements, India proposes that
patent applications include a statement as to the biological
source of the material and the country of its origin, and that the
74
application should be open to public scrutiny before approval.
Essentially these two requirements accomplish the same
objective, they require notice to be given to people who may
have some reason to object to the granting of the intellectual
property right. The suggestion of opening up the application to
public scrutiny, while it may have helped prevent an incident
like the neem tree, would not benefit developing or developed

168. CBD, supra note 52, at art. 16, para. 1.
169. See Verhoosel, supra note 144, at 58-59 (discussing the importance of
defining the word 'facilitating' so as to determine the scope of the obligation).
170. See id. at 61.
171. See id. at 64 (quoting David M. Haug, The International Transfer of
Technology: Lessons that East Europe can Learn from the Failed Third World
Experience, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 211 (1992)).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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countries. One of the main problems for developing countries in
patent recognition cases is that developing countries do not have
the internal bureaucracies and staff necessary to support the
patent application process. 175 Opening up the patent process to
public scrutiny would only be another step for a patentor to go
through in the patent process, and would just be another step
the patenting country must facilitate. It also could lead to
industrial sabotage or the needless use of trade secrets in place
of patent protection. If protection of indigenous cultures is the
purpose of this portion of India's proposal, creating greater
barriers which depend on the vigilance of people that may or
may not have access to the necessary information, may not be
the best way to accomplish this goal.
A better way to address the problem of exploiting
indigenous cultures and traditional knowledge is through the
dispute resolution system built in as a part of the TRIPs
Agreement. 176 The dispute resolution mechanism would allow
complaints such as the neem tree to be heard and resolved by
the country granting the patent. 177 Because a dispute
mechanism is already built into the TRIPs Agreement, it should
not be necessary to add extra dispute avoiding mechanisms
which possibly could slow down the patent granting system and
make the administration even more difficult for the already
overburdened patent administration of developing countries.
C.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTINCTIONS

India's proposal to include more foods and products under
the geographical indication requirement may have prevented
the neem tree incident, but the provision of including more foods
and products under the geographical distinction provision may
not be practical. One of the difficulties in extending the coverage
of geographical indication requirements lies in knowing where
to draw the line between a product deserving strong
geographical indication protection and products which do not
require as much protection. Article 22 does provide geographical
distinction protections for all products, but Article 23 provides a
175. See Sherwood, supra note 1, at 478-82 (discussing patent examination
application procedures and how they can be improved); see also Narsalay, supranote
44, at *4 (suggesting that the Indian legislature should "demand the creation of a
team that could provide technical and financial assistance to set up patent offices" in
order to aid India's compliance with TRIPs).
176. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 64.
177. See id. at art. 41, paras. 1 & 2.
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greater amount of protection for wines and spirits. 178 Article 23
requires countries to provide mechanisms for other countries
and individuals to object to the product receiving a wine or spirit
geographical indication, whereas Article 22 only allows it.179
Further, Article 23 sets up a multilateral system of notification
and registration which does not occur under the more general
protection of Article 22.180

The issue is whether Article 22 provides an adequate
amount of protection for general geographical indications and if
greater geographical protection will really help developing
countries compete with developed countries in patented areas.
Developing countries could argue that mandatory protection
limited to wines and spirits is a way for developed countries to
continue to protect their products while not granting similar
protection to products of developing countries. Developing
countries could further argue that there is nothing more unique
about the location of a wine or spirit than the location of a tea or
herb. But even if there are inconsistencies in the amount of
protection given to similar, or indistinguishable, products, it
does not necessarily mean the best way to fix the inconsistencies
is to grant protection for all products. The burdens on the patent
system should be weighed with the benefits of increased
protection. If it is agreed that the inconsistencies in Articles 22
and 23 must be resolved, even though geographical indication is
already a part of the intellectual property application, then
making another geographical indication hoop for inventors to
jump through might unduly burden the system, slow down the
process, and hamper its effectiveness.
IV. EXAMINING TRIPS IN LIGHT OF INDIA'S PROPOSAL
Although developing countries may feel that developed
countries have coerced them into recognizing intellectual
property rights which unfairly benefit the developed
countries, 18 ' in the long run greater intellectual property
178. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of
TRIPs Articles 22 & 23).
179. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 23, para. 1; see also supra notes
88-91 and accompanying text.
180. See id. at art. 23, para. 4 & art. 24.
181. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing developed
countries use of GATT to enact an intellectual property agreement even though such
an agreement could have been created through the United Nations' WIPO in which
developing countries have a greater voice).
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protection will better protect all parties. 8 2 Patent protection can
be used by developing countries to build their own industries
upon the production of patented materials and can be further
used to protect their biological resources from foreign
8 3
exploitation.
Even though greater patent protection can protect everyone
more effectively, not all patent protection plans will. Just as an
effectively implemented plan can lead to intellectual property
rights being beneficial to all countries, an intellectual property
rights plan which is not effectively implemented can lead to the
continued economic domination of developed countries over
developing countries.18 4 A plan that provides greater patent
protection and benefits for all must be implemented properly to
ensure equal protection. 85 A plan which ensures equal
protection means creating a patent protection system which
recognizes that some countries are more adept at creating
patentable rights and that there are certain areas independent
states should be allowed to maintain control over without
having to worry about foreign penetration. It also means
developing a plan that weighs and examines the enforcement
and administrative burdens in the accomplishment of its goal.
TRIPs is one method of creating, implementing, and
182. See McCabe, supra note 11, at 47 (citing Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPs
Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 492-93 (1997) for
the proposition that developed countries believe greater intellectual property
protection stimulates economic growth and enhances social welfare, and that
developing countries have agreed intellectual property protection is not limited to
benefiting developed countries).
A consensus is developing among scientists, world bodies, anthropologists,
and conservationists, that the best way for developing countries to capture
the benefits of biodiversity is through a system of intellectual property,
environmental and contractual protection designed to harmonize the goals
of development and conservation by building an international framework
for sustainable biodiversity prospecting.
McManis, supra note 24, at 270
183. See supra note 12. Mexico and Malaysia are examples of countries that
have instituted an intellectual property protection system and prospered
economically from its implementation. The implementation of the intellectual
property protection systems in these countries demonstrated to the rest of the world
that these counties could create a stable and predictable intellectual property
environment and thereby Mexico and Malaysia attracted more foreign investment
capital. See Caviedes, supra note 79, at 189.
184. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
185. See Reichman, supra note 7, at 273 (arguing that if appropriate strategies
are adopted, 'any competitive efforts that yield a foothold in the world market, and
any effective transfer of technology achieved in the process, should yield greater
potential returns than at present").
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enforcing greater patent protection. The CBD is another plan,
but with several different provisions and a different system for
implementation and enforcement. A third plan is India's
suggestion for the harmonization of the CBD and TRIPs. TRIPs,
even with its positive aspects, still lacks adequate mechanisms
to equalize the protection given to developed and developing
countries.
A.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF TRIPs

TRIPs gives all countries, industries, and individual
inventors, regardless of their level of development, a guaranteed
minimum amount of protection for their products and
inventions. 8 6 Once a product is registered, all GATT members
must give it protection.18 7 Prior to TRIPs, many countries only
had limited or non-existent laws to protect intellectual property
rights, and a single country's laws were not necessarily honored
in another country. 8 8 For example, India did not grant any
patents for pharmaceutical products prior to TRIPs, and Brazil
would not grant any patents for pharmaceutical products or
processes. 8 9 A further illustration is the Berne Convention
under which inventors were given a one-year grace period with
which to register patents in other member countries after the
patent had been recognized by one member country. The patent,
even if lawfully recognized in one country, was not recognized in
another country unless the patent was applied for with that
country within a one-year period. 190 But now under TRIPs,
members of indigenous cultures or allies of the groups can
patent a product of the groups' traditional knowledge in their
own country and TRIPs would then protect that product from
being taken by another country. A patent such as this could
avoid the result as seen in India's neem tree incident. By
patenting traditional knowledge, TRIPs gives nations the ability
to protect the traditional and communal knowledge of their
people and offer them greater protection so that national
resources will not be drained from one country by another
186. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting the minimal standards
agreement language of TRIPs).
187. See id. (quoting the language which makes TRIPs apply to all GATT
members).
188. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Berne and
Paris Conventions).
189. See Zhou, supra note 75, at 414.
190. See Berne Convention, supra note 68.
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country.191

TRIPs also addresses some of the differences between
developing and developed countries by giving developing
countries a longer period to enact adequate patent protection as
defined by TRIPs. 192 Further, TRIPs gives individual countries
control over material that it views as necessary for the ordre
public or morality and it allows exceptions for diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods, and for plants, animals, and
biological processes. 193 These exceptions are important and
should not be seen as weakening TRIPs.194 TRIPs still gives
pharmaceutical and chemical industries the right to patent,
while at the same time acknowledging certain products that
individual countries should be able to regulate. 195 Without these
exceptions, TRIPs could be seen as a way to keep products that
are imperative for the general welfare away from those who are
unable to pay for them. This could be seen as just another way
of keeping the underclass down permanently. 196 While the
TRIPs Agreement makes an exception for certain products, it
does not allow countries to exploit these exceptions. The ordre
public and morality exception can only be used if marketing of
the product is not allowed in the country at all.1 97 It does not
allow a country to refuse to acknowledge a patent because there
is a local business whose existence depends on the pirating of
1 98
products that are not patentable in the country.
Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement allows a country to deny
intellectual property protection in a few, narrowly defined areas,
and in other situations create a unique system in their country
for regulating the patentability of certain products. 199 It does not
take away the rights of a country to regulate a certain product;
191. See Marden, supra note 14, at 286-90 (discussing the need to protect
traditional and communal knowledge in a way which does not keep traditional
cultures subordinated).
192. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (quoting the language of
TRIPs which provides for transitional periods).
193. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the
TRIPs exceptions).
194. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing the possible and
real effects of the exceptions).
195. See Doane, supra note 92, at 275.
196. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (referring to Shiva's
argument that developed countries create laws such as TRIPs which drain resources
from developing countries).
197. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the ordre public
exception to TRIPs).
198. See id.
199. See supra notes 100-07 (discussing the limitations of the TRIPs exceptions).
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it just recognizes the unique need of certain countries to
regulate in a manner most beneficial to their country. This
narrow exception does not open up the gates for a country to
deny patent recognition for purely economic protectionist
reasons. For certain diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
processes, this may mean no patents are provided at all. These
exceptions could be seen as areas that are so imperative to
developing countries that developed countries have an
obligation to help countries obtain these technologies. 200 Finally,
the dispute resolution mechanism and the fact that TRIPs is
promulgated through GATT gives TRIPs teeth to enforce
compliance with its measures.
TRIPS
The only groups that are certain to benefit from greater
intellectual property protection are countries that already are
developed and have adequate systems for developing and
protecting patentable material. 201 These detriments of TRIPs to
the developing countries should not be ignored just because
B.

SHORTCOMINGS OF

everyone

could

benefit

in

the

long

run. 20 2 The

current

inequalities need to be addressed; otherwise they could distort

the protection that could help everyone in the long run.20 3 Two
200. See Verhoosel, supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the
positive commitment of developed countries to transfer technologies to developing
countries).
201. See id. (noting that strong intellectual property laws benefit those countries
which have long-term development strategies to promote sustained technological
innovation and effectively transfer research from universities and laboratories to
industries); see also Reichman, supra note 7, at 272 (recognizing that there is a
"delicate balance between the interests of states at different stages of development,
and the absorption of intellectual property will have to accommodate these norms
and that balance").
202. The United Nations has not ignored the detrimental effects of TRIPs to
developing countries. In August of 2000, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights passed a resolution leading to the indictment of the
WTO for its failure to respect international human rights in the creation of TRIPs.
See Kanth, supra note 2. The Sub-Commission resolution found that "[t]he
implementation of the Trips agreement of the WTO did not adequately reflect the
fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights." Id. "Trips compromises
the access of poor countries and communities to needed pharmaceuticals," said
Miloon Kothari of Habitat International Coalition of India and one of the sponsors of
the resolution. Id.; see also Shiva, supra note 53, at 56 (stating that any instrument
addressing issues of trade liberalization and globalization must explicitly include
provisions for strong protection of development and environmental issues of third
world countries in order to protect third world countries).
203. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (referring to Shiva's
argument that developed countries create laws which drain resources from
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inequalities in the TRIPs Agreement as it stands are the failure
to include any type of transfer agreements and the failure to
address granting patents to a group of people, such as an
indigenous community.
1.

Protectionof Indigenous Knowledge

Intellectual property protection could be used by an
indigenous community to patent or copyright a product which is
unique to its culture, but currently, TRIPs does not recognize
the right of community ownership to an intellectual property
right. Although India's proposal does not directly suggest
granting intellectual property 2rights to indigenous communities,
this has been a debated issue . 04
In general, intellectual property only recognizes the ability
of individual people or individual corporations to create a
product which warrants a patent. 20

5

The idea that a group of

people can take knowledge which evolved in that group over a
period of time and has been managed collectively simply is not
covered under intellectual property rights. 20 6 Therefore under
TRIPs, a patent
would not be available to an entire
'community.' 20 7 Further, the requirement of an "inventive step"
under TRIPs would more than likely exclude patent protection
for any well-known20 8folk remedies or common knowledge of
indigenous cultures.

The idea of making patents available to indigenous
communities to patent items they view as "traditional
knowledge" raises several issues. One issue is whether it is
realistic to expect an indigenous community or member to seek
out a patent on something it views as traditional knowledge.
This requires the indigenous community to have a certain
familiarity with a state's intellectual property recognition
developing countries and thereby keep developing countries as an underclass).
204. See Coombe, supra note 13, at 77-89.
205. See Tejera, supra note 49, at 974 n.60 (quoting that "(a) patent gives an
inventor the right to exclude others from making, using or selling his or her
patented invention." Robert PatrickMerges, PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 35 (Michie 2d
ed. 1997)). Although there are many restrictions, co-ownership is allowed in certain
situations. See id. at 1228.
206. See Coombe, supra note 13, at 87; see also Sarma, supra note 56, at 117
(stating that "(dieveloped countries have a eurocentric, individualistic
understanding of property that 'ignores the collective labor of generations'")
(citations omitted).
207. See Tejera, supra note 49, at 974.
208. See Long, supra note 12, at 277.
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procedure and to have an awareness of a piece of traditional
knowledge that could or should be patented.
Another issue is whether it is desirable to have traditional
knowledge patented at all. "Perhaps the most prevalent and
insidious form of appropriation of indigenous knowledge and
resources has been the construction of conceptual and legal
categories of valuable knowledge and resources that
systematically exclude the knowledge and resources of local
communities, farmers, and indigenous people." 20 9 Some argue
that patenting of indigenous knowledge could lead to the
extinction of such knowledge. 210 The view is that intellectual
property rights stifle creativity by limiting the ability to explore
and create, and further by stopping the free exchange of
knowledge in between groups. 211 Some scholars warn that the
extension of intellectual property rights to indigenous cultures
threatens fundamental human rights which are basic to a
democratic society by restricting the freedom of speech, the
freedom to share information, and the freedom to access vital
public domain. 212 The restriction of knowledge in this form
could, instead of protecting that knowledge, in fact restrict
knowledge and stop it from growing and developing in the
213
future.
Any intellectual property agreement which attempts to
include recognition of indigenous community rights needs to be
drafted carefully because indigenous groups are subject to
exploitation by both foreign states and the state in which they

209. Sarma, supra note 56, at 115-6 (quoting Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and
Shamans, 17 MICH J. INT'L L. 919, 929 (1996)).
210. See id. at 112 (stating, "[i]ronically, unless land is conserved, not only will
indigenous groups suffer, but so will transnational corporations and lesser developed
countries because they will not be able to exploit indigenous knowledge, since the
knowledge would ultimately become extinct").
211. See id. at 108-09.
212. See Coombe, supra note 13, at 78.
213. See Nabhan, supra note 4, at 192. The problem arises because
[e]nhancements [that] have occurred largely as a result of cooperative
exchanges and the elaboration of plant-specific information over
generations. While cases of forced or clandestine transfer of plant
germplasm... have been widely reported, it is less remembered that tribes
such as the Havasupai and Hopi regularly and freely exchanged seeds
when one or more of their communities had their fields devastated by
floods. To intervene today to protect a 'snapshot' of existing knowledge and
evolving seed heritages as one tribe's cultural legacy alone belies this
incremental and serendipitous evolutionary process.
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205

are located. 2 14 The desire of the developing countries to profit
from intellectual property rights and gain similar economic
status to developed countries by patenting indigenous
knowledge may lead to the state exploiting its own indigenous
community. 215 Developing countries benefit from indigenous
knowledge because it can be an inexpensive source of new ideas
and products. 216 Because both foreign and domestic states can
benefit from indigenous knowledge, it also follows that both
21 7
have an interest in preserving indigenous knowledge.
Allowing communities to own intellectual property rights
could reduce the need for making the application process more
burdensome. Instead of just having the right to object to a
patent, and thereby making the application process more
burdensome, a community could own the right itself. If the
community owned the patent, there would no need for an
extended objection process because the community could protect
itself by patenting the knowledge or product.
Certain provisions of the CBD more adequately address this
issue. In particular, Article 8 provides for the preservation of
218
biological resources and indigenous knowledge and practices.
Although India's proposal did not contain recommendations on
this matter, incorporating language such as this may more
effectively prevent some of the problems India was trying to
avoid. Particularly, the requirement of opening up patent
applications to the public may be more detrimental than
beneficial, 21 9 but adding a provision such as Article 8 of the CBD
to TRIPs would allow a community to protect its cultural

214. See
215. See
216. See
corporations
217. See
218. See

supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
id.
supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing how transnational
benefit from indigenous knowledge).
Sarma, supra note 56, at 112.
CBD, supra note 52, at art. 8. The exact language reads,

[elach Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate.. .(j)
Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and
practices.

Id.
219. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
opening up the patent application to public scrutiny).
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knowledge before it is patented by an outsider, not by objecting
to the outsider's patent, but by protecting the product with a
patent of its own.
2.

Transfer Agreements

One of the biggest areas of inequality is the failure of TRIPs
to include any transfer agreements on biological resources or
environmentally sound technology. These agreements are
essential to the continued dissemination of knowledge necessary
for development and to the fair treatment of biological resources
from one country to the next. The compulsory license provision
in TRIPs, while it allows for the suspension of patent rights, is
not explicit enough concerning the appropriate and desirable
area to use compulsory licenses. Further, compulsory licenses do
not create an affirmative obligation to transfer knowledge that
is desirable for developing countries to have in their own
development process. 220 The transfer agreements in the CBD
provide the specificity and affirmative obligation that TRIPs is
lacking in these areas. Since developed countries were able to
develop without the restrictions international patent rights
create, developing countries should not be denied the same
opportunity. 221 India's proposal and the CBD provide good
starting points for consideration of this type of amendment, but
both should be improved upon before either is added to TRIPs.

220. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (comparing the compulsory
license provision of TRIPs to the transfer agreement provisions of the CBD).
221. See generally Brenner-Beck, supra note 9 (enumerating the threshold that
a country must obtain before it can effectively benefit from strong intellectual
property right protection). India's Commerce Minister also shares the opinion that
developed countries took advantage of being able to develop in a time without strict
intellectual property right regulations and currently developing countries are
without such opportunities. See Nanda, supra note 10 (quoting the Commerce
Minister as stating that "[tihe industrialized nations extensively used reverse
engineering and other methods of imitative innovations during their own process of
industrialization. After having fully used that, they closed the door to developing
countries by restricting them, thereby making technological catching up more
difficult than before"). India's Commerce Minister will concede that the intent of the
WTO may not be to hold developing countries as a permanent underclass, but he
still believes the advantages of developed countries still should be addressed as
many of the conflicts between developed and developing countries arise because
developing countries perceive the WTO as trying to keep them a permanent
underclass. See id. (quoting Maran as saying "there is today mismatch between
what is being intended in all sincerity and what is being perceived, especially by
developing and least-developed nations. The controversies that have affected the
WTO are symptomatic of this mismatch").
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One area for improvement is a reduction in the ambiguous
terms. As argued earlier, what it means to "transfer" these
technologies should be defined in functional terms. 222 A
functional definition of transfer involves determining what it
takes to get the resource to the transferee. This could be
different depending upon each transferee's abilities. Also, the
223
obligation of countries in the transfer process should be clear.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, changes need to be made to the TRIPs
Agreement in order to protect all countries, developing and
developed, equally. Although there are many positives and
negatives in granting communities intellectual property rights,
TRIPs needs to at least address the issue of protecting
communal knowledge from external and internal exploitation.
Whether it be through granting communities intellectual
property rights, strengthening geographical indications, or
making the opportunity to object to patents more available to
all, TRIPs should not condone or promote exploitation of
indigenous cultures but attempt to stop any type of cultural
imperialism. Further, TRIPs needs to be amended to allow for
transfer
agreements
for
biological
resources
and
environmentally sound technology. As long as developing
countries lag behind developed countries, TRIPs should
recognize these inequalities and attempt to put all countries on
an equal playing field. TRIPs should ensure that developing
countries are not left without access to technologies that are
imperative to development and biologies that are unique to its
environment. Patent right protections should work to protect
individuals, not allow a more powerful individual to exploit a
less powerful individual.

222. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (defining a functional
definition of transfer).
223. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguities
of the CBD with regard to transfer agreements).

